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OUTGOING TELEGRAM **Department of State**

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NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ 84-318
By ___, NARA, Date 7-23-91

PARIS TODEL 1415 FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE.

1. On the basis of the judgments you have expressed to the Secretary in telecon, your message to Thieu when you see him early tomorrow morning, your time, should be as follows:

a. The President ~~XXXXXXXX~~ will issue the order to stop bombing, etc., at about 2000 Washington time on the 31st (0900 on the 1st, Saigon time). The order ~~XXXXX~~ will take effect 12 hours later.

b. The President ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ is conveying word of this intention to the North Vietnamese ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ tonight making clear that we expect that the next meeting in Paris ~~XXXX~~ not before November 6, will take place under the agreed representation formula with GVN representation welcome.

c. The President earnestly hopes that Thieu will join with him in the presently agreed joint announcement, to be issued

Drafted by:	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
EA:WPBundy:mk 10/30/68	4235	The Secretary

Clearances:

White House - Mr. Rostow S/S - Mr. Read

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in the two capitals at the time the order is given.

d. If Thieu is unable to associate himself with the decision, the President will make the announcement unilaterally at the time the order is issued. He would make clear the essential elements of the present joint announcement.

2. In explaining the President's decision, you should review the factors contained in the oral message you delivered yesterday, with utmost force. We would regret as deeply as anyone if we are not able to act jointly, but the long history of consultation and agreement on this matter make it impossible for the President to withdraw or make further modification in the proposal to which his negotiators have, step by step, virtually committed themselves.

3. In addition, you have the following additional arguments and assurances (already discussed in telecon) to use as you see fit.

a. The fact that the North Vietnamese agreed in Paris today to bury the secret minute.

b. We have now given the GVN nearly a week, to get ready for the first meeting on November 6.

c. As we are spelling out in greater detail in septel, we are prepared to give explicit Presidential assurances that go slightly

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beyond your ~~xxx~~ memorandum, on our delegation ~~xx~~ treating the opposing side as a unit, and on the GVN having a primary role in every possible way. The President will say in his talk to the nation "I emphasize that NLF attendance in no way involves recognition of the NLF in any form."

d. By the same septel, we are offering to talk directly to Hanoi about procedures, before the first meeting, to attempt to set the GVN fears at ~~xxx~~ rest.

4. ~~XX~~ In conveying this message, you may make clear that the President has your full reports of your meetings with Thieu and Thanh, and has read Thieu's letter with care. He regrets to find in these discussions and in the letter nothing but a repetition of points that had long been gone over and agreed by Thieu himself during the course of our consultations. In the absence of any change in the situation whatever, the President simply cannot accept these arguments as valid reasons for not going ahead with the arrangement that has now been virtually reached.

5. Finally, in whatever way you deem most effective, you should seek in the strongest terms to dissuade Thieu from any speech or other utterance or GVN leaks that could prejudice the success of the whole undertaking. Highest level here is distrubed at talk on these matters coming every hour on the hour from Saigon; for example, Washington Star headline this afternoon in early edition was "Thieu agrees to bombing halt"; in later edition it was "Thieu says end of war near." Whether or not Thieu actually joins in the announcement, we assume the GVN will be put in the position where it will virtually have to ~~xxxxxxxx~~ ~~xxxxxxx~~ participate, ~~xx~~ and Thieu must be made to realize that any

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US/GVN apparent friction will do nothing but grievous harm to his own cause and make it impossible for Americans to continue to support it. These views are shared by the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the JCS, and leading Viet-Nam supporters in the Congress.

6. Secretary Rusk wishes to emphasize that this message in no way diminishes the strength of our desire to obtain Thieu's cooperation and nothing stated herein should lead him to under-estimate the gravity of the situation if he should fail to do so.

GP-1

END

RUSK

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